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ABSTRACT
STATUS-SEEKING AND CATCHING UP IN THE
STRATEGIC RAMSEY MODEL
Mehmet O¨zer
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Hu¨seyin C¸ag˘rı Sag˘lam
September 2008
This thesis analyzes the qualitative implications of the strategic interaction
on the standard Ramsey model in terms of catching up. We have shown
that the strategic interaction among agents in the economy leads the poor
to be able to catch up with the rich, which is not the case for the standard
Ramsey model where the initial wealth differences perpetuate. Secondly,
within this framework, we incorporate the relative wealth effect and conclude
that the catching up amoung agents depends on the share of two classes in
the economy. If the share of two classes is same, there exist unique symetric
steady state, whereas if the share of two classes are different the steady state
is assymetric. Morever, the steady state level of aggregate capital stock is
higher than the that of standard Ramsey model. Finally, we introduce the
relative consumption effect and reach the conclusion that whatever the share
of classes, the gap between the initial wealth level of two classes will disappear
in the long run. In addition, the steady state level of aggregate wealth level
is same with the that of standard Ramsey model.
Keywords: Strategic interaction, Status-seeking, Catching up, Ramsey model.
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O¨ZET
STRATEJI˙K RAMSEY MODELI˙NDE STATU¨
ARAYIS¸I VE YAKINSAMA
Mehmet O¨zer
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Hu¨seyin C¸ag˘rı Sag˘lam
Eylu¨l 2008
Bu tezde stratejik etkiles¸imin, standart Ramsey modelin sınıflarn birbirine
yakınsaması hakkındaki sonuc¸larını niteliksel olarak nasıl deg˘is¸tirdig˘ini in-
celedik. Ekonomideki bireyler arasındaki stratejik etkiles¸imin, fakirler
ve zenginler arasındaki bas¸langıc¸ servet farklılıg˘ını durag˘an dengede or-
tadan kaldırdıg˘ını go¨sterdik. Standart Ramsey modelde, bas¸langıc¸ servet
farklılıkları uzun do¨nem durag˘an dengede de su¨rmektedir. I˙kinci modelde,
stratejik ilis¸ki iskeletine sadık kalarak go¨receli servet etkisini fayda fonksiy-
onuna eklemledik. Bu model altında, ekonomideki iki sınıfın birey sayılarının
es¸it olması durumunda durag˘an dengenin tek ve simetrik oldug˘u sonucuna
vardık. Dig˘er taraftan, iki sınıfın birey sayılarının farklı olması, bas¸langıc¸
servet farklılıklarının durag˘an dengede de su¨regelmesine neden olmaktadır.
Bunun yanısıra, go¨receli servet etkisinin ekonomideki durag˘an denge toplam
sermaye miktarının standart Ramsey modeldekinden fazla olmasına neden
oldug˘u sonucuna ayrıca ulas¸tık. Son olarak, yine stratejik etkiles¸im iskele-
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tine sadık kalarak, modele go¨receli tu¨ketim etkisini ekledik ve vardıg˘ımız
sonuc¸ sınıfların ekonomideki oranlarından bag˘ımsız olarak durag˘an dengede
fakirlerin zenginlere yetis¸mekte oldug˘udur. Bu model altında, ekonomideki
durag˘an denge toplam sermaye miktarı standart Ramsey modelindekiyle aynı
olmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Stratejik Etkiles¸im, Statu¨ Arayıs¸ı, Yakınsama, Ramsey
Modeli.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Literature Survey
The dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Ramsey (1928) is one
of the most popular frameworks for dynamic macroeconomic analysis. It can
be viewed as a model of competitive capital accumulation that describes the
interaction of firms and households on the markets for output, labor, and cap-
ital. The model economy consists of a representative firm and infinitely many
rational households. Households are infinitely lived and own the production
factors, capital and labor services. The firm hires capital and labor from the
households and produces a single output on a perfectly competitive market.
The output is bought by the households and is either used for consumption
or saving to form future capital. Households maximize their discounted life-
time utility depending on their consumption of the output good subject to
their intertemporal budget constraint. Under the assumption that there are
infinitely many households, it must be noted that each household acts as a
price taker on all markets (see Sorger, 2007 ).
Several extensions of the standard Ramsey model have been proposed to
analyze the long-run distribution of wealth among heterogeneous agents in
the economy. There are important differences in representative agent dy-
namic equilibrium models and models with heterogeneous agents. Becker
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(1980) demonstrated that the economy’s long-run stationary state capital
would be concentrated in the most patient household if the households, for-
bidden to borrow against their future labor income, differ in their discount
rates (Ramsey conjecture). On the other hand, if all households have the same
time-preference rate, then the long-run distribution of wealth distribution de-
pends on the initial distribution of wealth and is therefore history-dependent
(see Kemp and Shimomura, 1992; Sorger, 2006). Consistent with these, Van
Long and Shimomura (2004) showed that the initial wealth inequality will
persist in the long run so that the poor individuals will never be able to catch
up with the rich in such a Ramsey model economy.
In order to overcome such an important drawback of Ramsey model econ-
omy, wealth-dependent preference or time-preference rates, wealth-dependent
capital returns have been proposed1. Lucas and Stokey (1984), for example,
assume that the wealthier a household is the more impatient it becomes. Sarte
(1997) assumes progressive taxation of capital income, which implies that the
return to capital is decreasing with respect to the wealth of a household.
Van Long and Shimomura (2004) consider relative wealth (status seeking)
as an argument of the reduced form utility functions of the individuals as
relative wealth yields greater social status and status matters for individual
well-being2.
In this analysis, we will concentrate on yet another mechanism that leads
to catching up in such a Ramsey model economy. This mechanism rests
on the observation that the price taking behavior is no longer a reasonable
assumption if one considers finite number of agents or finite number of in-
come groups (classes) in the economy. As a matter of fact, as there are only
1Another modification of the standard Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model proposed to
address the problem with the long-run wealth distribution relies on uncertainty. See Becker
and Zilcha (1997), Aiyagari (1994) or Krusell and Smith (1998).
2Formally, all of these approaches imply that the wealth of a household appears in its
Euler equation.
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finitely many households, each one of them can take the effects of their de-
cisions on market prices into account and realize that the strategic action is
inevitable. Indeed, Sorger (2002) proposed a strategic model in which the
households understood that their capital accumulation decisions directly in-
fluenced capital’s rental price, although they still behaved competitively in
the labor market and showed that this prevents the Ramsey conjecture from
coming true. As the most patient household should realize that a reduction
of its own capital supply increases the rental rate on capital and, hence, its
own capital income, the resulting higher return on capital, in turn, would
induce also less patient households to acquire positive capital stocks in the
long run. These observations become especially important if one takes into
account the fact that relative wealth yields greater social status and status
matters for individual well-being.
In what follows, we will analyze the competitive and strategic forms of the
Ramsey model and identify to what extent the strategic interaction among
agents in the economy affects the long run wealth distribution and hence,
catching up. However, since the simpler case of the competitive model pro-
vides guidance for the strategic model’s possibilities, we will first present, or
recall in detail, some of the results from that theory.
1.2 Ramsey Model and Catching Up
Kemp and Shimomura (1992) and Van Long and Shimomura (2004) examine
a heterogeneous agent version of Ramsey model where private agents were
assumed to differ only in their initial wealth. They analyze whether the
initial wealth differences will perpetuate and persist in the steady state or
fade away so that catching up occurs. To do so, the economy is assumed to
consist of two groups of individuals; those who are initially rich and those who
are initially poor. The measure of the set of initially rich and initially poor
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individuals are α1 and α2, respectively with α1 + α2 = 1. The initial capital
stock of a poor individual is k10 and that of rich one is k2(0) > k1(0). Each
individual taking the paths of the rental rate, r(t) and the wage rate, w(t)
as given in a perfectly competitive economy solves the following optimization
problem where U(ci) denotes the utility obtained from consumption and ki0
are exogenously given initial level of wealth:
∀i ∈ {1, 2} max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(ci(t))dt (P)
subject to
.
ki(t) = r(t)ki(t) + w(t)− ci(t),
ki(0) = ki0,
and
lim
t→∞
ki(t)e
 
tR
0
r(s)ds
!
= 0,
The utility function is assumed to have constant elasticity of marginal utility
( β = constant ) and the production function is assumed to verify all neoclas-
sical properties. Since in a competitive equilibrium the rental rate is given
by r = f
′
(k) and the wage rate is f(k) − kf ′(k), one can easily obtain the
following system of four differential equations:
.
ki(t) = f
′
(k(t))ki(t) + f(k(t))− k(t)f ′(k(t))− ci(t), (1.1)
.
ci(t) = βci(f
′
(k(t))− ρ), (1.2)
where k = α1k1 + α2k2.
The standard neoclassical properties assumed for the utility and the pro-
duction functions ensure the existence of a unique positive steady state.
At the steady state, the level of aggregate capial stock is characterized by
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f
′
(k∗) = ρ. One can easily note from (1.2) that
.
c1(t)
.
c2(t)
c1(t)
c2(t)
= β(f
′
(k(t))− ρ),
and the ratio of c2(t) \ c1(t) is constant over time.
In what follows, it is shown that if k1(0) 6= k2(0), then k1(t) and k2(t) will
converge to two different stock levels, k∗1 6= k∗2.
Proposition 1 We have, k∗1 = k
∗
2 if and only if the initial wealth levels are
identical. Moreover, there exists a continuum of steady state wealth distribu-
tions and a corresponding continuum of one-dimensional stable manifolds so
that inequalities persist.
Proof See Van Long and Shimomura (2004). 
The studies of Kemp and Shimomura (1992) and Van Long and Shimo-
mura (2004) show that the initial wealth inequality will persist in the long
run and hence, the poor individuals will never be able to catch up with the
rich in such a Ramsey model economy.
In order to reach a better understanding of the notion of catching up in
neoclassical growth models, it is inevitable to introduce wealth (status seek-
ing) as an argument of the reduced form utility functions of the individuals,
and consider whether the poor individuals may be willing to sacrifice con-
sumption in the early stage of their life to build up wealth and eventually
catch up with the rich as well (see Corneo and Jeanne, 2001 and Van Long
and Shimomura, 2004).
1.3 Status-Seeking and Catching Up
The assumption that the households take utility only from their own con-
sumption has been shown to be not so realistic in a dynamic perspective.
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Under this assumption, as the income of an individual, and hence his con-
sumption increase, one would expect that its welfare will increase as well.
However, despite the continually rising prosperity in the developed countries,
there are considerable fluctuations in the percentage of those who say they
were very satisfied in terms of their welfare. Consistent with this, Ehrhardt
and Veenhoven (1995) shows that the percentage of those who have attained
the highest level of welfare over time is almost constant and even sometimes
declining as the prosperity increase. Therefore, it is inevitable to think of
a model in which the households do not take utility only from their own
consumption but also from their relative position in the society.
Veblen (1922) notes that, it is not wealth but relative wealth which is
important for the human being. It is argued that relative wealth yields greater
social status and status matters for individual well-being. Bakshi and Chen
(1996) provide empirical support to the spirit of the capitalism hypothesis
(wealth accumulation not only for consumption) and show that the investors
acquire wealth not just for its implied consumption, but also for its induced
status. Cole et al. (1992), Corneo and Jeanne (1997) present that when
individuals care about their social status, optimal saving behavior is affected
in systematic ways and the normative properties of the equilibrium path
strongly differ from the conventional models.
In order to analyze the effect of such an empirically relevant status seeking
motive on catching up, Van Long and Shimomura (2004) incorporate the
relative wealth of each agent in their utility function in an additively separable
manner. In a perfectly competitive set up, each individual takes also the path
of aggregate capital stock in the economy as given and solves,
∀i ∈ {1, 2} and ∀t ∈ R+ max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
U(ci(t)) + V
(
ki(t))
k(t)
))
dt
(P ′)
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subject to
.
ki(t) = r(t)ki(t) + w(t)− ci(t), ki(0) = ki0, and
lim
t→∞
ki(t)e
 
tR
0
r(s)ds
!
= 0.
The necessary conditions of optimality leads to following system of differ-
ential equations:
.
ki(t) = f
′
(k(t))ki(t) + f(k(t))− k(t)f ′(k(t))− ci(t), (1.3)
.
ci(t) = βci
f ′(k(t))− ρ+ 1
k (t)
V ′
(
ki(t))
k(t)
)
U ′(ci(t))
 ,∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (1.4)
Assuming a strictly concave function V (.) implies, a strong incentive for
the poor to accumulate as a poor individual attributes a higher value to a
marginal increase in his relative wealth than a rich individual. Indeed, if the
elasticity of marginal utility of relative wealth is greater than the elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption, there exists a symmetric steady state
(k∗1 = k
∗
2 = k
∗ and c∗1 = c
∗
2 = c
∗ = f(k∗)) and there are no asymmetric steady
states to this model implying that poor individuals will be able to catch up
with the rich.
Recently, the ”envy” effect namely, the ”keeping up with Joneses” as-
sumption has been put forward as a way of incorporating the status-seeking
motives of the individuals in neoclassical growth models. According to this,
people take utility from their relative consumption with respect to the level
of consumption in their peer group or in the aggregate economy. This is
based on the observation that the property acquisition and the conspicuous
consumption are two conventional bases for social esteem in the sense that
the households would consume conspiciously in order to increase their so-
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cial status (see Veblen, 1922). Raucher (1997) analyzes whether this social
status-seeking behavior, accelerate economic growth and whether the capital
accumulation should be subsidized to correct for status externality. Fisher
and Hof (2000) incorporates the envy effect into the Ramsey model and study
the match between the decentralized and social planner solutions and propose
the optimal taxation in presence of such consumption externality. Turnovsky
and Penelosa (2007) have shown that in case of heterogeneous agents, this
effect cause less inequality than the case of no consumption externality. De la
Croix (1998) internalizes the relativity of satisfaction using habit formation
and analyzes its dynamic implications in a Ramsey model economy. However,
it must be noted that these papers do not take into account the strategic in-
teractions among agents in the economy. As relativity concern directly leads
agents to decide their path of consumptions and savings strategically, the
analysis of the strategic Ramsey model with status-seeking agents becomes
increasingly important.
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL
The main assumption in all of the models discussed so far is that there are
infinitely many agents in the economy and hence, the agents are price takers
in all markets. However, as pointed in Sorger (2006), this common assump-
tion of infinitely many households is obviously unjustified. In reality, we have
finite number of agents but this number is so great that someone can ignore
the individual’s effect on the aggregate variables. As a matter of fact, so-
cial or economic similarities enforce individuals to constitute small number
of groups (classes) containing the same type of individuals (in terms of their
relative position in the economy). The members of each group have similar
tendency in their social and economic decisions. Therefore, we are in an eco-
nomic structure where there are powerful groups affecting the economy wide
variables. Since members of each group are rational, they should be aware
of their market power. Indeed, this awareness directly motivates individuals
to act strategically. Thus, a model with relativity and catching up concern
including the agents’ awareness of their market power on the variables would
be more consistent if one considers finite number of agents in the economy.
Thus, our primary aim is to incorporate strategic behavior into such mod-
els and to analyze the qualitative implications of them in terms of long run
wealth distribution, and hence catching up.
In what follows, we will analyze how the conclusions of Ramsey growth
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model on the long run distribution of wealth, and hence catching up would
change when one takes into account the influence of the decisions of each
agent on the aggregate variables as well.
2.1 Strategic Ramsey and Catching up
We propose a strategic Ramsey equilibrium model in which the households
understand that their capital accumulation decisions directly influence the
capital’s rental price, and the wage rate. Households differ only in their initial
wealth, so each supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The set of households
isH = {1, 2, ..., n}, where n ∈ N denotes the number of households. Following
Van Long and Shimomura (2004), we assume that there are two groups of
households; those who are initially rich and those who are initially poor. The
measure of the set of initially rich and poor individuals are α and (1 − α),
respectively. Except for the assumption that households realize their market
power, this is the standard infinite-horizon model with heterogeneous agents.
Let ci denote the consumption level of type i individual and Ki his wealth.
The aggregate production function, Y = f(K) = F (K,N) has the usual neo-
classical properties. The properties of the utility and the production functions
are detailed in the following assumptions.
Notation 1 Ui : R+ → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on R++ with
Ui(0) = 0, U
′
i > 0, U
′
i (0+) =∞, and U ′′i < 0 for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Notation 2 f : R+ → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on R++ with
f
′
> 0, f
′′
< 0 and satisfies the Inada conditions, i.e. limk→0 f ′(K) =∞ and
limk→∞ f ′(K) = 0.
The represantative firm maximizes its profit where f ′(K) = FK(K,N),
FL(K,N) = [f(K) − Kf ′(K)] \ N and K = αNK1+ (1 − α)NK2. The
rental return on capital is f
′
(K(t)) and the wage earning for the one unit of
inelastically supplied labor is [f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))] \N .
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In strategic equilibrium, each household when maximizing his lifetime
utility subject to the usual budget constraints will take into account the
influence of his accumulation decisions on the capital’s rental price and the
wage rate. Then, the problem of an individual i recast as follows:
∀i ∈ {1, 2} and ∀t ∈ R+ max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(ci(t))dt (2.1)
s.to
.
Ki(t) = f
′
(K(t))ki(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− ci(t), (2.2)
Ki(0) = Ki0. (2.3)
The Hamiltonian for the optimization problem of an individual belonging
to first group is
H(c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t)) = e
−ρtU(c1(t))+
λ1(t)
(
f ′(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t)
)
(2.4)
The set of necessary conditions of optimality will then be written as folows:
Hc1( c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t) ) = 0 =⇒ e−ρtU
′
(c1(t)) = λ1(t), (2.5)
HK1(c1(t), K1(t), K(t), λ1(t)) = −
.
λ1(t)
which implies
−
.
λ1(t)
λ1(t)
= f
′
(K(t)) +K1(t)αNf
′′
(K(t))+
f
′
(K(t))αN − αNf ′(K(t))−K(t)αNf ′′ (K(t))
N
, (2.6)
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and
Hλ1(t) =
.
K1(t) =⇒
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t)+
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t).
The necessary conditions are also sufficient if the limiting transversality con-
dition limt→0 e−ρtλ1(t)K1(t) = 0 holds. From equations (2.5) and (2.6), we
get the Euler equation:
.
c1(t)
c1(t)
=
1
θ
[
f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
]
(2.7)
under CIES form of utility funtion with an intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, θ.
Similarly, one can easily write the Hamiltonian and the corresponding set
of necessary conditions of optimality for the problem of a type 2 agent (1−α
share group) and solve accordingly. We have then the following system of
four differential equations:
.
c1(t)
c1(t)
=
1
θ
[
f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
]
(2.8)
.
c2(t)
c2(t)
=
1
θ
[
f
′
(K(t))− ρ− (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
]
(2.9)
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t) (2.10)
.
K2(t) = f
′
(K(t))K2(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c2(t) (2.11)
A steady state is a quadruple (K∗1 , K
∗
2 , c
∗
1c
∗
2) such that the right hand
sides of the equations (2.8)-(2.11) equal to zero. A steady state is said to be
symmetric if K∗1 = K
∗
2 , and c
∗
1 = c
∗
2. Accordingly, a steady state is said to be
asymmetric if K∗1 6= K∗2 .
In the following proposition, taking into account the strategic interaction
amoung agents, we show that the catching up prevails in the economy, so
that even if the agents have initially different level of wealth, they will reach
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to the equal level of wealth at the steady state.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions (1) and (2), there exists a unique sym-
metric steady state and there are no asymmetric steady states.
Proof From equations (2.10) and (2.11), at the steady state we have:
f
′
(K∗)− ρ = −(1− α)αNf ′′ (K∗)(K∗1 −K∗2)
f
′
(K∗)− ρ = (1− α)αNf ′′ (K∗)(K∗1 −K∗2)
It is obvious that the left hand sides of these two equations are equal. There-
fore, the right hand sides should also be equal. Since we have the assumption
of strict concavity on production function, f
′′
(K∗) < 0, the condition that
satisfies these two equations simultaneously is K∗1 = K
∗
2 . 
2.1.1 Steady state and the stability analysis
Linearizing the equations (2.8)-(2.11) around their unique steady state gives
the following 4× 4 Jacobian matrix1:
J≡

0 0 θNf(K∗)f
′′
(K∗)α(2− α) θNf(K∗)f ′′ (K∗)(1− α)2
0 0 θNf(K∗)f
′′
(K∗)α2 θNf(K∗)f
′′
(K∗)(1− α2)
−1 0 f ′(K∗) 0
0 −1 0 f ′(K∗)

In order to find the characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix, we solve
det[J − µI] = 0 and obtain the following eigenvalues:
1The linearization of dynamic equations is given in the Appendix.
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µ1 =
1
2
(B −
√
B2 − 4ACφ)
µ2 =
1
2
(B +
√
B2 − 4ACφ)
µ3 =
1
2
(B −
√
B2 − 8αACφ+ 8α2ACφ)
µ4 =
1
2
(B +
√
B2 − 8αACφ+ 8α2ACφ)
where A = f(K(t)), B = f
′
(K(t)), C = f
′′
(K(t)), and φ = θN. One can eas-
ily see that µ2 and µ4 are positive whereas µ1 and µ3 are negative. Therefore,
we have two positive and two negative real characteristic roots implying that
the system is stable in the saddle point sense. This implies that the poor will
be able to catch up with the rich in a strategic Ramsey economy.
It is clear from this analysis that introducing strategic interaction among
agents changes the qualitative properties of the standard Ramsey model. In
the absence of strategic interaction, poor will never be able to catch up with
the rich as pointed in Van Long and Shimomura (2004). However, incorporat-
ing the strategic behavior among agents leads to the wealth level of the two
classes to be the same at the stationary state. However, it must be noted that
the strategic interaction among agents leads to a change in the transitional
dynamics and the catching up property of the standard Ramsey model, the
aggregate level of capital stock is left unchanged at the stationary state.
2.2 Strategic Ramsey Model with relative
wealth
Van Long and Shimomura (2004) proved that if relative wealth appears in the
reduced form utility function (because of the status concern) then the poor
will catch up with the rich if the elasticity of the marginal utility of relative
wealth is greater than the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. The
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crucial questions here are as follows: if the agents in the economy realize
their effects on the aggregate variables, will this affect the qualitative results
of the Van Long and Shimomura (2004)? How will the results differ from the
strategic Ramsey model of the previous section?
Since Veblen (1922), economists take relative wealth into account as a
proxy of the social status. In these models, individuals do not take utility
only from their consumption but also from their relative wealth. This relative
wealth effect has been put into utility function in an additively separable
way2. However, in our model the decision of an individual on consumption
and accumulation of capital affects the average level of wealth and the factor
incomes.
Again, we have N individuals populated in the economy and two groups
of people differing only in terms of their initial capital stock. The share of
the two groups in the population are α and 1− α, respectively. In addition,
individuals supply their one unit of labor inelastically.
The economic problem of an individual i ∈ {1, 2} is the maximization of
the lifetime utility subject to the law of motion of the respective capital stock.
For all i ∈ {1, 2},
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
U(ci(t)) + V
(
Ki(t))
αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t)
))
dt (2.12)
subject to
.
Ki(t) = f
′
(K(t))Ki(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− ci(t),∀t, (2.13)
Ki(0) = Ki0 (2.14)
2Corneo and Jeanne (2001) formalizes the relative wealth as v(at−At) where At denotes
average wealth at time t and atdenotes the individual’s wealth. This is precisely the way
in which Akerlof (1997) incorporates social status into his model. However, for comparison
purposes we use the model structure of Van Long and Shimomura (2004).
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where
V
(
Ki(t))
αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t)
)
= V (si).
Notation 3 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Vi : R+ → R+ is twice continuously differentiable
on R++ with Vi(0) = 0, V
′
i > 0, V
′
i (0+) =∞ and V ′′i < 0.
The strict concavity of V (si) means that a poor person gets more pleasure
from a marginal increase in his relative wealth than a rich person. It should
be noted that this creates a strong incentive for the poor to accumulate.3
The Hamiltonian for the optimization problem of an individual belonging
to the first group is :
H(c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t)) = e
−ρt{U(c1(t)) + V ( K1(t))
αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))}+
λ1(t){f ′(K(t))K1(t) + f(K(t))−K(t)f
′
(K(t))
N
− c1(t)} (2.15)
Hence, we get the Euler equation:
.
c1(t) =
1
θ
c1(t){f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf
′′
(K(t))(K1(t)
−K2(t)− c1(t) V
′(s1(t))
U ′′(c1(t))
(1− α)K2(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2}
and the law of motion of the capital stock:
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t).
Similarly, we can write the problem of an individual belonging to the
second group (1− α, share group) and solve accordingly. Since the problem
3One may notice that individual’s relative wealth is defined as the individual’s wealth
over the average level of wealth in the economy.
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and the steps are similar, the exposition of the problem is omitted to avoid
repetition. After solving the two problems, we have obtained following the
dynamic equations for the Ramsey model in case of strategic interaction with
the presence of relative wealth in the reduced form utility function:
.
c1(t) =
1
θ
c1(t){f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf
′′
(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t)−
c1(t)
V ′(s1(t))
U ′′(c1(t))
(1− α)K2(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2 )} (2.16)
.
c2(t) =
1
θ
c2(t){f ′(K(t))− ρ− (1− α)αNf
′′
(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t)−
c2(t)
V ′(s2(t))
U ′′(c2(t))
αK1(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2 )} (2.17)
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t) (2.18)
.
K2(t) = f
′
(K(t)K2(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c2(t) (2.19)
The effect of relative wealth can be isolated in the terms containing V ′(.)
in the Euler equations In order to make the steady state analysis possible, we
use two different cases in which we put a restriction on the share of classes,
α and 1− α.We will show that the qualitative properties of the steady state
changes depending on the value of α.
Proposition 3 If the share of two classes are different, then there exists at
least one economy such that steady state is asymmetric(no catching up) and
if the share of two classes are same (i.e α = 1 \ 2 ) then the unique steady
state is symetric( poor will be able to catch up with the rich).
Proof Case 1: α 6= 1 \ 2.
Proof of this statement is by contradiction. Assume α 6= 1 \ 2 and let the
steady state be c∗1 = c
∗
2 = c
∗ and k∗1 = k
∗
2 = k
∗. Then, from the dynamic
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equations we have
− ρ− (1− α)αNf ′′ (k∗)(K∗1 − k∗2)−
V
′
(1)
U ′′(c∗)
αK1(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2 =
− ρ− (1− α)αNf ′′ (K∗)(K∗1 −K∗2)−
V
′
(1)
U ′′(c∗)
αK1(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2 .
Then, we have,
V
′
(1)
U ′′(c∗)
(1− α)K∗
(K∗)2
=
V
′
(1)
U ′′(c∗)
αK∗
(K∗)2
,
which implies α = (1−α) so that α = 1\2; a contradiction. Thus, if α 6= 1\2
the steady state is asymmetric.
Case 2: α = 1 \ 2
In this part, we take the following functional forms for the utility and the
production functions
f(K(t)) = (αNK1(t) + (1− α)NK2(t))β ,
U(ci(t)) = ln ci(t),
V (zi(t)) = ln zi(t).
where β = 0.3 and the population size N = 100. From the steady state
conditions, we have
f
′
(K∗)K∗1 +
f(K∗)−K∗f ′(K∗)
N
= c∗1,
and
f
′
(K∗)K∗2 +
f(K∗)−K∗f ′(K∗)
N
= c∗2.
Substituting the production function, we obtain that
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c∗1 = (
1
2
)βNβ(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
βK
∗
1 +K
∗
2(1−N)
N(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
,
c∗2 = (
1
2
)βNβ(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
βK
∗
2 +K
∗
1(1−N)
N(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
.
At the steady state, the two dynamic equations, (2.18) and (2.19) are equal
to zero, implying that
c∗2
V ′(s2(t))
U ′′(c2(t))
K∗1
2(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
− c∗1
V ′(s1(t))
U ′′(c1(t))
K∗1
2(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
=
1
2
f
′′
(K∗)(K∗1 −K∗2).
Substituting utility and production functions and α = 1 \ 2 into the above
equations, we come up with,
(
1
2
)βN2β(K∗1+K
∗
2)
2β((
K∗2 + (N − 1)K∗1
N(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
)2K∗21 −(
K∗1 + (N − 1)K∗2
N(K∗1 +K
∗
2)
)2K∗22 ) =
(
1
2
)β+3Nββ(β − 1)(K∗1 +K∗2)β−2(K∗1 −K∗2)K∗1K∗2 .
We know that at steady state we have K∗1 = ηK
∗
2 for η ∈ (0,∞). A
further investigation leads that η which satisfies the above equation is either
−1 or +1. Since the amount of capital stock for each individual at the steady
state cannot be negative, the only possible case is η = 1.Results are robust
for the values of N and β. Thus, at the steady state the capital stocks of the
two classes are equal so that catching up occurs. 
These two cases imply that if the share of two heterogeneous groups and
their initial level of capital stocks are different, then in the long run (i.e. at
the steady state) the capital stock for the two groups will be different as
well. In other words, there is no catching up among the agents. However, if
they have equal shares in the society, whatever the initial level of wealth they
have, at steady state, the level of capital stock will be same for all agents.
The intuition behind this conclusion is that α and 1 − α shares shows the
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relative degree of effectiveness on the aggregate variables where the agents are
strategic status seekers and consumers. If the weight of each class is same,
classes converge towards each other in terms of their long run wealth.
Since we are focusing on catching up, we will now analyze the level of
capital stock and the consumption at this unique symmetric steady state
(α = 1 \ 2) and perform the stability analysis.
2.2.1 Steady state and the stability analysis
The level of capital stock and the consumption at this unique symetric steady
state can easily be obtained as follows:
f
′
(K∗) = ρ+ c∗
V ′(1)
U ′′(c1(t))
1
2K∗
(2.20)
c∗ =
f(K∗)
N
(2.21)
After linearizing the dynamic equations around the steady state, we derive
the following 4× 4 Jacobian matrix4:
c∗2
K∗ 0 c
∗(3
8
Nf
′′
(K∗)− 3c∗2
4K∗ ) c
∗(1
4
Nf
′′
(K∗) + c
∗2
4K∗ )
0 c
∗2
K∗ c
∗(1
4
Nf
′′
(K∗) + c
∗2
4K∗ ) c
∗(3
8
Nf
′′
(K∗)− 3c∗2
4K∗ )
−1 0 f ′(K∗) 0
0 −1 0 f ′(K∗)

This Jacobian matrix have two positive and two negative real character-
istic roots (-0.066, -0.019, 0.1028, 0.1507) implying that the system is stable
in the saddle path sense. These results are robust to the parameter values
provided that the utility function is in the form of CIES and the production
function is strictly concave and increasing.
In contrast with Van Long and Shimomura (2004), the relationship be-
tween the elasticity of the marginal utility of relative wealth and the elasticity
4The linearization of system is in Appendix.
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of marginal utility of consumption is not important for the catching up. The
crucial element that affects the catching up turns out to be the share of
the two classes in the economy. However, our result concerning the steady
state level of aggregate capital stock is consistent with that of Van Long and
Shimomura (2004). Introducing status concern a la relative wealth and in-
corporating strategic interaction cause an increase in the steady state level of
aggregate capital stock of the economy.
In standard Ramsey model with and without the strategic interaction
incorporated, the marginal productivity of capital at the steady state is equal
to the constant time preference rate. However, the second term in equation
(2.20) implies that the marginal productivity of capital at the steady state
is less than the constant time preference rate. Since the production function
is strictly increasing and strictly concave, the steady state capital stock in
the economy will be higher provided that the share of groups is the same, if
individuals are status seekers and act strategically. This result confirms the
empirical evidence provided by Bakshi and Chen (1996) as well.
2.3 Strategic Ramsey model with envy effect:
The aim of this section is to investigate the influence of the status seeking
behavior a la relative consumption in a standard version of the Ramsey model
with heterogeneous agents acting strategically. To do so, we use an additively
separable utility function in terms of the agent’s own and relative consump-
tion. The other assumptions of the model are the same as in the previous two
sections. Accordingly, the individual i ∈ {1, 2}, solves the following problem:
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
U (ci(t)) + V
(
ci(t))
αc1(t) + (1− α)c2(t)
))
dt (2.22)
subject to
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.Ki(t) = f
′
(K(t))Ki(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− ci(t) (2.23)
Ki(0) = Ki0. (2.24)
where the aggregate capital stock is:
K(t) = αNK1(t) + (1− α)NK2(t),
and the average level of consumption is:
−
c = αc1(t) + (1− α)c2(t)
The specifications of function V are stated in the following assumption.
Notation 4 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Vi : R+ → R+ is twice continuously differentiable
on R++ with Vi(0) = 0, V
′
i > 0, V
′
i (0+) =∞ and V ′′i < 0.
We set up the Hamiltonian for the problem of an individual belonging to
the first class (α, share group) :
H(c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t)) =
e−ρt
(
U(c1(t)) + V (
c1(t))
αc1(t) + (1− α)c2(t))
)
+
λ1(t)
(
f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t)
)
. (2.25)
The necessary conditions of optimality are as follows:
Hc1 ( c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t) ) = 0⇒
e−ρt
(
U
′
(c1(t)) +
(1− α)c2(t)
(
−
c)2
V
′
(z1(t))
)
= λ1(t),
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where we denote
z1(t) =
c1(t))
αc1(t) + (1− α)c2(t) . (2.26)
Hk1(c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t)) = −
.
λ1(t)⇒
−
.
λ1(t)
λ1(t)
= f
′
(K(t)) +K1(t)αNf
′′
(K(t)+
f
′
(K(t))αN − αNf ′(K(t))−K(t)αNf ′′ (K(t))
N
(2.27)
λ1(t){f ′(K(t)) + αNf
′′
(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))} = −
.
λ1(t) (2.28)
H
λ1
(c1(t), K1(t), λ1(t)) =
.
K1(t)⇒
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t) (2.29)
−
.
λ1(t) = ρe
−ρt
(
U
′
(c1(t)) +
(1− α)c2(t)
(
−
c)2
V
′
(z1(t))
)
−
{ .c1(t)U ′′(c1(t))+(1− α)(
.
c2(t)(
−
c)2 − 2(α .c1(t) + (1− α) .c2(t))(−c)c1(t)
(
−
c)4
V
′
(z1(t))+
(1− α)c2(t)( .c1(t)(−c)− (α .c1(t) + (1− α) .c2(t))c1(t))
(
−
c)4
V
′′
(z1(t))}
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Hence, we get the Euler equation:
.
c1(t) = −
U ′(c1(t)) + (1−α)c2(t)(−c )2 V ′(z1(t))
G

(
f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
)
+
V
′
(z1(t))2(1− α)2
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V ′
′
(z2(t))c2(t)
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c1(t)) +
(1−α)c2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z1(t))
where
G = U
′′
(c1(t))− ∂V (z(t))
∂z(t)
2(1− α)αc2(t)(−
c
)3 + V ′′(z1(t))c2(t)2(1− α)2
(
−
c)4
Similarly, we can write the individual problem for the second group and
solve accordingly. We have obtained the following system of dynamic equa-
tions for the Ramsey model in case of strategic interaction with the presence
of relative consumption in the reduced form utility function:
.
c1(t) = −
U ′(c1(t)) + (1−α)c2(t)(−c )2 V ′(z1(t))
G

(
f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
)
+
V
′
(z1(t))2(1− α)2
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z1(t))c2(t)
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c1(t)) +
(1−α)c2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z1(t)),
(2.31)
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.
c2(t) = −
 U ′(c2(t)) + αc1(t)(−c )2 V ′(z2(t))
U ′′(c2(t))− V ′(z2(t))2(1−α)αc1(t)
(
−
c )3
+ V ′′(z2(t))
c1(t)2(1−α)2
(
−
c )4

(
f
′
(K(t))− ρ− (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
)
+
V
′
(z2(t))2(1− α)2
.
c1(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z2(t))c1(t)
.
c1(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c2(t)) +
αc2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z2(t)),
(2.32)
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t),
.
K2(t) = f
′
(K(t))K2(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c2(t). (2.33)
2.3.1 Catching-up and stability analysis
Proposition 4 If each agents realize their effect on the interest rate and
wage earning and if relative consumption effect appear in the reduced form
utility function, then even if their initial capital stocks are different, in the
long run (at steady state) there will be catching up amoung agents.
Proof As we can easily see from the equations (2.33) and (2.33), at steady
state we have, like in the Strategic Ramsey model, following conditions:
f
′
(K∗) − ρ − (1 − α)αNf ′′ (K∗)(K∗1 − K∗2) = f ′(K∗) − ρ + (1 −
α)αNf
′′
(K∗)(K∗1 −K∗2)
Since by assumption α ∈ (0, 1) and f ′′ (K(t)) < 0 (strict concavity of
production function), we have at equilibrium K∗1 = K
∗
2 . 
Unlike the status seeking a la relative wealth in which the catching up
depends on the share of two classes, whatever the share of two classes in the
economy and whatever their initial capital stock is , poor will be able to catch
up with the rich at the steady state. The other important result of this section
is that when compared with the strategic Ramsey model, the envy effect
just cause to change transitional dynamics of the economy, the steady state
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capital stock and consumption levels are same for the both models. As we
can see from equations (2.31)-(2.33), the steady state values of consumption
and aggregate capital are:
f
′
(K∗) = ρ (2.34)
c∗ =
f(K∗)
N
(2.35)
It must be noted from equations (2.34) and (2.35)that in the model with rela-
tive consumption appearing in reduced form utility function and the presence
of strategic interaction among agents leads to a change in the transitional dy-
namics and the catching up property of the standard Ramsey model, the
aggregate level of capital stock is left unchanged at the stationary state.
To look at the stability of system, we linearize the equations (2.31)-(2.33)
around the unique symmetric steady state, where c∗1 = c
∗
2 = f(K(t)) \N and
K∗1 = K
∗
2 = K
∗ so that 4× 4 Jacobian matrix will be the following:5∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 L M
0 0 P Q
−1 0 f ′(k∗) 0
0 −1 0 f ′(k∗)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where
L =
2− α
2− α2
(c∗(1 + 2α− α2)− α(1− α2))
(1 + 2α− α2) Nf
′′
(K∗)
(
α(2− α) + α2(1− α2)
(1 + 2α− α2)
)
M =
2− α
2− α2
(c∗(1 + 2α− α2)− α(1− α2))
(1 + 2α− α2) Nf
′′
(K∗)
(
(1− α)2 + (1− α
2)2
(1 + 2α− α2)
)
P =
1 + α
2− α2
(c∗(1 + 2α− α2)− α(1− α2))
(1 + 2α− α2) Nf
′′
(K∗)
(
α2 +
α2(2− α)2
2− α2
)
Q =
1 + α
2− α2
(c∗(1 + 2α− α2)− α(1− α2))
(1 + 2α− α2) Nf
′′
(K∗)
(
α2 +
α2(2− α)(1− α)2
2− α2
)
Without loss of generalization we assume the following form of utility and
5The linearization of dynamic equations are in Appendix.
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production function:
U(ci(t)) = ln ci(t),
V (zi(t)) = ln zi(t),
f(K(t)) = K(t)β,
where N = 100, β = 0.3, ρ = 0.05.We have four eigenvalues, two of which are
real and in opposite sign and two of which are complex and positive impliying
that the system is stable in the saddle point sense. The results are robust for
any values of the parameters β, ρ, and N.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSION
The main assumption in all one sector growth models is that there are in-
finitely many agents in the economy and hence, the agents are price takers in
all markets. However, this assumption is unjistified for two reasons. In reality,
we have finite number of agents but this number is so great that someone can
ignore the individual’s effect on the aggregate variables. As a matter of fact,
social or economic similarities enforce individuals to constitute small number
of groups (classes) containing the same type of individuals (in terms of their
relative position in the economy). The members of each group have similar
tendency in their social and economic decisions. Therefore, we are in an eco-
nomic structure where there are powerful groups affecting the economy wide
variables. Since members of each group are rational, they should be aware
of their market power. Indeed, this awareness directly motivates individuals
to act strategically. Thus, a model with relativity and catching up concern
including the agents’ awareness of their market power on the variables would
be more consistent if one considers finite number of agents in the economy.
Secondly, empirical evidences show that agents are status-seekers (in terms
of relative wealth or relative consumption). Hence, individuals are affected
by the other agents’ decisions. Indeed, agents are strategic status-seekers.
In this thesis, we have analyzed the qualitative implications of the strate-
gic interaction on the standard Ramsey model in terms of catching up among
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heteregenous agents. We have shown that the strategic interaction among
agents in the economy leads the poor to be able to catch up with the rich,
which is not the case for the standard Ramsey model where the initial wealth
differences perpetuate. Secondly, within this framework, we incorporate the
relative wealth effect and conclude that the catching up amoung agents de-
pends on the share of two classes in the economy. If the share of two classes
is same, there exist unique symetric steady state, whereas if the share of two
classes are different the steady state is assymetric. Morever, the steady state
level of aggregate capital stock is higher than that of standard Ramsey model.
Finally, we introduce the relative consumption effect and reach the conclusion
that whatever the share of classes, the gap between the initial wealth level of
two classes will disappear in the long run. In addition, the steady state level
of aggregate wealth level is same with the that of standard Ramsey model.
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APPENDIX
The linearization of the dynamic equations of capital stock:
Since the evolution of capital stocks are same for all three models, first
of all we linearize these differential equations.
.
K1(t) = f
′
(K(t))K1(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t)
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂c1
= −1
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂c2
= 0
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂K1
= f
′
(K(t)) + αNK1(t)f
′′
(K(t))
+
αNf
′
(K(t))− αNf ′(K(t))−K(t)αNf ′′ (K(t))
N
,
which can be recast as
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂K1
= f
′
(K(t)) + (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t)).
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂K2
= (1− α)K1(t)Nf
′′
(K(t))+
(1− α)Nf ′(K(t))− (1− α)Nf ′(K(t))−K(t)(1− α)Nf ′′ (K(t))
N
,
that simplifies to
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂K2
= (1− α)2Nf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t)).
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Since at steady state K∗1 = K
∗
2 = K
∗, c∗1 = c
∗
2 = c
∗, we have
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂K1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = f
′
(K(t)),
∂(
.
K1(t))
∂K2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0.
From the evolution of the second individual’s capital stock:
.
K2(t) = f
′
(K(t))K2(t) +
f(K(t))−K(t)f ′(K(t))
N
− c1(t),
it is clear that
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂c1
= 0,
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂c2
= −1.
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂K1
= αK2(t)Nf
′′
(K(t))+
αNf
′
(K(t))− αNf ′(K(t))−K(t)αNf ′′ (K(t))
N
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂K1
= −α2Nf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂K2
= [f
′
(K(t)) + (1− α)NK1(t)f
′′
(K(t)) + (1− α)f ′(K(t))−
(1− α)Nf ′(K(t)) +K(t)(1− α)Nf ′′ (K(t))
N
]
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂K2
= f
′
(K(t))− (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))
Since at steady state K∗1 = K
∗
2 = K
∗, c∗1 = c
∗
2 = c
∗, we obtain
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂K2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0
∂(
.
K2(t))
∂K2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = f
′
(K(t))
Linearization of the Euler equations of the model with strate-
gic interaction:
: Taking the partial derivatives of equations (2.8) and (2.9) with respect
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to c1, c2, K1, K2, and evaluating at the symetric steady state, we have
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0,
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0,
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = θNf(K
∗)f
′′
(K∗)α(2− α),
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = θNf(K
∗)f
′′
(K∗)(1− α)2,
and
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂c1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0,
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂c2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0,
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂K1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = θNf(K
∗)f
′′
(K∗)α2,
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂K2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = θNf(K
∗)f
′′
(K∗)(1− α2).
Linearization of Euler equations of the model with relative
wealth and strategic interaction:
Since the capital accumulation equations are same with the previous
model we need only to linearize the dynamic equation for consumption
with recpect to c1(t), c2(t), K1(t), K2(t) around the steady state values
K∗1 , K
∗
2 , c
∗
1, c
∗
2.
.
c1(t) =
1
θ
c1(t){f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf
′′
(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))−
c1(t)
V ′(s1(t))
U ′(c1(t))
(1− α)K2(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2 )}
One can easily obtain that
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c1
=
1
θ
c1(t){V
′(s1(t))
U ′(c1(t))
(1− α)K2(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2−
c1(t)
U ′′(s1(t))
U ′(c1(t))2
V ′(s1(t))
(1− α)K2(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2},
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c2
= 0,
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and
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K2
=
1
θ
c1(t){(1− α)Nf
′′
(K(t))+
(1− α)2αN2f ′′′(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))+
(1− α)c1(t)
U ′(c1(t))
[
V ′(s1(t))
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))3 (αK1(t)− (1− α)K2(t))+
(1− α)K1(t)K2(t)V ′′(s1(t))
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))4 ]}.
Similarly for
.
c2(t),
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂c1
= 0,
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂c2
=
1
θ
c1(t){V
′(s2(t))
U ′(c2(t))
αK1(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2−
c2(t)
U ′′(s2(t))
U ′(c2(t))2
V ′(s2(t))
αK1(t)
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))2},
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂K1
=
1
θ
c2(t){α2Nf
′′
(K(t))−(1−α)α2N2f ′′′(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))+
αc2(t)
U ′(c2(t))
{ V
′(s2(t))
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))3 (1− α)K2(t)− αK1(t)
+
−αK1(t)K2(t)V ′′(s2(t))
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))4}},
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂K2
=
1
θ
c2(t){α(1− α2)Nf
′′
(K(t))−
α(1− α)2N2f ′′′(K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))+
αc2(t)K1(t)
U ′(c2(t))
{− V
′(s2(t))
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))32(1− α)K(t)+
αK1(t)V
′′(s2(t))
(αK1(t) + (1− α)K2(t))4}}.
Without loss of generalization we assume the following form of util-
ity and production function:U(ci(t)) = ln ci(t), V (zi(t)) = ln zi(t) and
f(K(t)) = K(t)β where K(t) = αNK1(t)+ (1−α)NK2(t),and param-
eters values are n = 100, α = 0.4, β = 0.3, ρ = 0.05. Then we obtained
35
the first two rows of the Jacobian matrix as follow:
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} =
c∗2
k∗
,
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0,
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = c
∗(
3
8
Nf
′′
(k∗)− 3c
∗2
4K∗
),
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = c
∗(
1
4
Nf
′′
(K∗) +
c∗2
4K∗
).
Linearization of Euler equations of the model with relative
consumption and strategic interaction:
From the equations (2.31) and (2.32), we have the following Euler equa-
tions:
.
c1(t) = −
 U ′(c1(t)) + (1−α)c2(t)(−c )2 V ′(z1(t))
U ′′(c1(t))− V ′(z1(t))2(1−α)αc2(t)
(
−
c )3
+ V ′′(z1(t))
c2(t)2(1−α)2
(
−
c )4

{f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))}+
V
′
(z1(t))2(1− α)2
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z1(t))c2(t)
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c1(t)) +
(1−α)c2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z1(t))
,
.
c2(t) = −
 U ′(c2(t)) + αc1(t)(−c )2 V ′(z2(t))
U ′′(c2(t))− V ′(z2(t))2(1−α)αc1(t)
(
−
c )3
+ V ′′(z2(t))
c1(t)2(1−α)2
(
−
c )4

{f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))}+
+
V
′
(z2(t))2(1− α)2
.
c1(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z2(t))c1(t)
.
c1(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c2(t)) +
αc2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z2(t))
.
For the sake of expositional simplicity, let us adopt the following nota-
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tion:
X = −
 U ′(c1(t)) + (1−α)c2(t)(−c )2 V ′(z1(t))
U ′′(c1(t))− V ′(z1(t))2(1−α)αc2(t)
(
−
c )3
+ V ′′(z1(t))
c2(t)2(1−α)2
(
−
c )4
 ,
Y =
V
′
(z1(t))2(1− α)2
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z1(t))c2(t)
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c1(t)) +
(1−α)c2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z1(t))
,
Z =
V
′
(z1(t))2(1− α)2
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z1(t))c2(t)
.
c2(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c1(t)) +
(1−α)c2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z1(t))
,
T =
V
′
(z2(t))2(1− α)2
.
c1(t)
(
−
c )2
+ (1−α)
2V
′′
(z2(t))c1(t)
.
c1(t)
(
−
c )4
U ′(c2(t)) +
αc2(t)
(
−
c )2
V ′(z2(t))
.
Accordingly, the equations (2.31) and (??) can be recast as follows,
.
c1(t) = X
(
f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t)) + .c2(t)Y
)
,
.
c2(t) = Z
(
f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t)) + .c1(t)T
)
.
By substituting the
.
c2(t) from equation (??) into equation (??), we
obtain
.
c1(t) =
X
1− TZY [{f
′
(K(t))−ρ+(1−α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))+
ZY {f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))}].
We will now take the derivatives of the equations above with respect to
{c1(t), c2(t), K1(t), K2(t)} and evaluate these derivatives at the steady
state values.
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c1
=
∂( X
1−TZY )
∂c1(t)
[{f ′(K(t))−ρ+(1−α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))+
ZY {f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))}]+
X
1− TZY [{f
′
(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))+
∂Z
∂c1(t)
Y {f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))}]+
Z
∂Y
∂c1(t)
{f ′(K(t))− ρ+ (1− α)αNf ′′ (K(t))(K1(t)−K2(t))}.
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Then, we have
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0,
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂c2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0.
Now taking derivative of equation (2.31) with respect to K1(t) and
K2(t), we obtain:
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K1
=
X
1− TZY
(
α(2− α)Nf ′′ (K(t)) + ZY {α2Nf ′′ (K(t))}
)
,
∂(
.
c1(t))
∂K2
=
X
1− TZY
(
(1− α)2Nf ′′ (K(t)) + ZY {(1− α2)Nf ′′ (K(t))}
)
.
For the Euler equation of the second individual, we apply the same
procedures and find the following entiries of the corresponding Jacobian
matrix:
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂c1
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂c2
| {c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2} = 0
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂K1
|{c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2}=
Z
1−XTY [α
2Nf
′′
(K(t))
+ TX{α(2− α)Nf ′′ (K(t))}]
∂(
.
c2(t))
∂K2
|{c∗1,c∗2,K∗1 ,K∗2}=
Z
1−XTY [(1− α
2)Nf
′′
(K(t))
+ TX{(1− α)2Nf ′′ (K(t))}]
Without loss of generalization we assume the following form of util-
ity and production function:U(ci(t)) = ln ci(t), V (zi(t)) = ln zi(t) and
f(K(t)) = K(t)β where K(t) = αNK1(t) + (1 − α)NK2(t), N = 100,
α = 0.4, β = 0.3, and ρ = 0.05. Denoting χ = (c
∗(1+2α−α2)−α(1−α2))
(1+2α−α2) , we
have:
L =
2− α
2− α2χNf
′′
(K∗)
(
α(2− α) + α2(1− α2)
(1 + 2α− α2)
)
,
M =
2− α
2− α2χNf
′′
(K∗)
(
(1− α)2 + (1− α
2)2
(1 + 2α− α2)
)
,
P =
1 + α
2− α2χNf
′′
(K∗)
(
α2 +
α2(2− α)2
2− α2
)
,
Q =
1 + α
2− α2χNf
′′
(K∗)
(
α2 +
α2(2− α)(1− α)2
2− α2
)
.
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